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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant Holli Lundahl requests oral argument on the following grounds:
1.

Based upon the ruling in &UNDAHL i

and

the Utah Supreme Court's

failure to yield a competent result in LUNDAHL I through
Petition

for Writ of

Certiorari

LUNDAHL'S

in appeal case no. 20010049

[See

pending motion to reinstate appeal case no. 20010049-CA due to extrinsic
mistake] & based upon Ray Harding Jr's fraud committed at both the trial
court level and before the Utah Appellate Court, LUNDAHL requests that
oral argument be given in this case because LUNDAHL'S Utah Governmental
Immunity Act claim against a judicial officer is the first case to have
ever been properly served administrative process thus giving a trial
court

subject matter

jurisdiction

to reach the claims of fraud and

malice committed by a judicial officer.

Accordingly the Utah Court of

Appeals will be deciding a First Impression case.

As such this case

should be orally argued for a full comprehensive record to be considered
by higher courts should the appellate process proceed in that manner.
LUNDAHL'S OBJECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND THE
STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPROPRIATE TO THIS APPEAL
1.

Appellees claim that the entry of a default judgment is neve?:

a ministerial matter and therefore LUNDAHL failed to state a claim for
relief against Ray Harding Jr.

[This issues raises an identical issue

to LUNDAHL r S Issue nos, 3 & 4, but against a different official.]
OBJECTION:

LUNDAHL contends that entry of a default judgment

under URCP rule 55(b) (1) by a clerk of the court for a sum certain pled
in a verified complaint or by affidavit,

is a ministerial matter and

1.
Mike Tronier could not enter a default judgment for money
damages against Continental Insurance Company now CNA Financial
Corporation aka Loes Corporation because LUNDAHL's complaint did not
plead a sum certain damage against this defendant; therefore Lundahl's
motion for entry of default judgment for money damages against CNA was

accordingly plaintiff properly stated a claim against Mike Tronier
Appellees

claim

that

this

issue was not raised in the trial

court.
OBJECTION:

LUNDAHL directly raised this issue in the trial court

by verified First Amended
cross motion for summary

Complaint and by her joint Opposition and
judgment on her verified FAC in her favor.

The trial court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice
and thereby mooted LUNDAHL's cross claims.
STANDARD
claimed

right

America

Realty

OF

REVIEW:

to

default

Credit

Because
judgments

Corporation

the facts
as

and

supporting

LUNDAHL's

against defendants Empire
Source

One Mortgage

of

Services

Corporation are undisputed [see ultimate facts in exhibits "51" and "57"
attached to OB] ,

this issue raises only a question of law for which

this Court gives the trial c o u r t s ruling no deference and reviews it
under the correctness standard.

Zion's First National Bank v. Fos &

Co., 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997).

2.

Appellees

claim

that LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory

relief and injunction claim against them is an attempt to collaterally
attack final decisions of Ray Harding Jr and therefore not permitted.
[This issue is similar to the second part of LUNDAHL's issue no. 2.]
OBJECTION:
allow

her

to

LUNDAHL denies that her EX PARTE YOUNG claim does not
collaterally

attack

void

interlocutory

orders

which

2
represent imminent and prospective harm to her.
2.
It should be noted that one month after Ray Harding Jr
entered the at issue interlocatory orders, Ray Harding jr refused to
certify the foregoing interlocutory orders as final under rule 54(b) or
to sever LUNDAHL's claims against the foregoing
defendants from her
unrelated claims against the other defendants. Additionally the Utah
Supreme Court denied LUNDAHL's petition for interlocutory appeal under
rule 5. [See exhibit "35" attached to OB for this order.] Subsequently

Appellees claim that the foregoing issue was not raised in the
trial court.
OBJECTION:

It

is

true

that

the appellee's

did not

raise

a

collateral attack defense during the trial of the underlying action and
accordingly should not be permitted to raise this defense now.
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW:

No

review

should be permitted

on

this

question.

See State of Utah v. South, 924 P.2d 354, fn 3 (Utah 1996)

(refusing

to address argument offered on appeal in defense of lower

court's decision where argument was not raised in pleadings or argued by
the parties below.)
3.

Appellees claim that LUNDAHL sought to add new claims and

causes of action that were not set out in her original notice of claim
or her original complaint.

[This issue is similar to the first part of

LUNDAHL's issue no. 2.]
OBJECTION:

LUNDAHL filed TWO Notices of claims as set forth in

exhibits "1" and "3" attached to the Opening Brief.

LUNDAHL's

Second

Notice of claim identifies the fraud committed by Ray Harding Jr.

in

LUNDAHL I and additional fraud committed by Mike Tronier in case no.
the state action was removed to the federal court and consolidated with
a federal action which was ordered indefinitely stayed until final
disposition of several state actions pending in the third judicial
district court in Salt Lake.
[See exhibit "10" in O.B., second part,
the court docket for stay order.]
Because the interlocutory orders
entered by Ray Harding Jr. are part of the stayed federal case which has
now been stayed for 3H + years and is likely to be stayed for additional
years, because Ray Harding Jr refused to certify his interlocutory
orders as final and because the Utah appellate court refused to grant
LUNDAHL permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal [see exhibit "35"
attached to O.B.], the questioned orders were not able to be turned over
or brought into question in the same proceeding. URCP rule 1, FRCP rule
1 and the First Amendment petition clause entitle LUNDAHL to a speedy,
just and inexpensive resolution of her claims.
LUNDAHL has been denied
these rights.
In addition LUNDAHL has suffered past and stands to
suffer future harm based upon Harding Jr's freezing of proper and fair
appellate review of the interlocutory orders as more fully exculpated in
this brief.

990402021 and other actions LUNDAHL had pending before other courts.
Post

filing

the second Notice

of Claim,

LUNDAHL merged

the claims

presented in both Notices into her First Amended Complaint. 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
motion to dismiss.

This matter was decided below on defendants

Because the issue raises only a question of law, the

Court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under
the correctness standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co., 94?
P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997).
4.

Appellees

claimed

that

they

were

entitled

to

absolute

judicial immunity under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. [This Issue
raises similar issues to LUNDAHL'S issue nos. 3-8.]
OBJECTION:

LUNDAHL

claimed

that both

official

and personal

immunities were waived under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act because
the rule 60(b) subject matter jurisdiction violations committed by Ray
Harding Jr; the rule 55(b)(1) violations committed by Mike Tronier in
case no. 990402021, and; the rule 55(a) violations by Mike Tronier in
case

no.

990403068

immunity protection.

were

ministerial

acts

not

entitled

to

official

Furthermore LUNDAHL argued that she had sued th^

defendants personally under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and that
the personal defense of absolute judicial immunity was waived under the
UGIA since the defendants performed or failed to perform their duties
3.
In December of 2001, the trial court claimed lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over LUNDAHL's clciims presented in the second Notice
of claim because the second notice was served upon the Attorney General
after the action was commenced by the original complaint.
In other
words LUNDAHL was not permitted to merge additional claims and facts
which became actionable by the Second Notice of claim into the pending
action by the filing of a First Amendc^d Complaint.
The trial court was
incorrect in dismissing LUNDAHL7 s Utah Governmental Immunity Act Claim
as it pertained to the second Notice of Claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the doctrine of merger and bar required LUNDAHL tQ
merge her administrative claims.

through fraud and malice. Under federal law, the appellees actions were
not immuned under the EX PARTE YOUNG Doctrine.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided on defendant's motion
to dismiss.

Because the facts were undisputed, this issue only raises a

question of law which this Court reviews under the correctness standard
granting the trial court's ruling no deference. Zions First Nat'l Bank,
942 P.2d at 326.
5.
Harding

Appellees

claim

that

all of LUNDAHI/s

Jr. are barred by res judicata.

claims against Ray

[This issue is similar to

LUNDAHL'S issue nos. 1 & 2.]
OBJECTION:

LUNDAHL claimed that Ray Harding Jr's fraud committed

in LUNDAHL I barred res judicata application and further that the trial
court lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a Utah Governmental
Immunity

Act

claim

at

the time LUNDAHL

I was commenced because

the

administrative process had not yet run it's coarse.
This issue was raised by defendant's motion to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Because the facts underlying this claim were

undisputed, this issue raises solely an issue of law which this Court
reviews under a correctness standard granting no deference to the trial
court's ruling. ZIONS, supra.
6.

Appellees claim that all of LUNDAHL's claims against Deputy

clerk Tronier are barred by Collateral estoppel by the prosecution of
LUNDAHL I against Ray Harding JR.

Appellees admit this issue was not

raised in the trial court below.
OBJECTION:

This issue was not raised in the trial court below

and therefore appellees have waived this issue on appeal.
4.

4

Moreover contrary to Appellees contention, this court is

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellees waived the right to challenge this
issue because it was not raised in the trial court below.

State v.

South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996).
7.

APPELLEES HAVE WAVED THE RIGHT TO ARGUE THAT RAY HARDING JR'S

RULE 60(B) (1) RULINGS MADE WITHOUT THE FILING OF THE REQUIRED MOTIONS BY
EMPIRE OF AMERICA AND SOURCE ONE MORTGAGE WITHIN THE 3 MONTH STATUTORY
TIME PERIOD UNDER RULE 60(B)(1),

DEPRIVED RAY HARDING JR OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION TO GRANT EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE ANY EQUITABLE RELIEF
FROM THE DEFAULT ORDERS/JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST THEM.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
LUNDAHL AGREES WITH APPELLEES DETERMINATIVE STATUTES PLUS ADDS:
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(b) (1) :
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake,
inadvertence,
surprise
or excusable neglect
(2) newly
discovered evidence...; (3) fraud whether heretofore denominated as
intrinsic or extrinsic; misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
...the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1) , (2) & (3) , not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order or proceeding entered or taken.
additionally barred from considering this issue because Tronier was not
made party to the EX PARTE YOUNG claim prosecuted against Ray Harding
Jr. in LUNDAHL I and because the issue of Mike Tronier's failure to
enter a sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE in his capacity
as the clerk under URCP rule 55(b)(1) was never argued or raised in
LUNDAHL
I nor was Tronier's failure
to enter certain default
certificates in case no. 990403068 an issue raised in LUNDAHL I.
LUNDAHL sought decrees declaring:
(1) the October 12, 1999
interlocutory order vacating the defaults/judgments against EMPIRE and
SOURCE ONE void based upon Ray Harding Jr's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction to grant equitable relief to EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE,
(2)
the January 25, 2000 oral dismissal order as to LUNDAHL's claims against
CNA [committed to writing on February 18, 2000], void, as not barred
by res judicata;
(3) the March 7, 2000 order quashing LUNDAHLAs service
on SOURCE ONE as allegedly improper, as void; and (4) the order granting
dismissal of LUNDAHL As claims against EMPIRE on the basis of the
December 10, 1995 accord & settlement agreement, as void, on the basis
that LUNDAHL A s claims against EMPIRE accrued after the December 10, 1995
fifi^lement acrreement termed.

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees

fail

to

acknowledge

that

when

LUNDAHL

filed

an

Opposition to appellees motion to dismiss her First Amended Complaint,
Lundahl also cross moved for summary judgment in her favor on her claims
set forth in her First Amended Complaint. Moreover on December 27, 2001
LUNDAHL filed a rule 54 (b) motion to correct the December 10, 2001 ordes
not a rule 59 order.

On February 22, 2002 the trial court entered a

final judgment affirming the

December 10, 2001 ruling on the motion to

dismiss while simultaneously denying LUNDAHL7 s rule 54 (b) motion which
sought

to

declare

the

defendants

jurisdictional

argument

as

moot.

Appellees statement of the case is otherwise correct.

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEES STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1.

Appellees are correct that they did not challenge the factual

claims made in LUNDAHL's

FAC which comprise nearly identical facts as

presented by LUNDAHL in her statement of facts set forth in her opening
brief.

Furthermore the defendants did not challenge the validity of

any document attached to the FAC, which documents are now attached to
the Opening Brief and support LUNDAHL y s factual contentions.
2.

Appellees are correct that LUNDAHL sued 19 defendants in

state

case no. 990402021 and obtained default certificates against 3 of the 19
defendants named in state case number 990402021 after these 3 defendants
were properly and personally served and failed to appear.
OBJECTION:

Appellees

fail to note however that LUNDAHL also

submitted and obtained a sum certain default judgment against defendant
EMPIRE [ex. "51" attached to O.B.] and submitted a

sum certain proposed

default judgment against SOURCE ONE [ex. "57" attached to O.B.].

3.

Appellees are correct that Ray Harding Jr. conducted a hearing

on September 23, 1999

pursuant to

LUNDAHL'S request to enter a default

judgment for uncertain money damages against CNA.
OBJECTION:

Appellees fail to note however that 40 days prior to

the hearing date,

Judge Harding Jr. ordered SOURCE ONE and EMPIRE to

appear for the September 23, 1999 hearing by way of rule 60(b)(1) in
order to challenge the default judgment entered against EMPIRE and the
sum certain default judgment LUNDAHL sought against Source One. Although
counsel for EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE appeared at the September 23, 1999
hearing, they did not file any rule 60(b)(1) motions to set aside
defaults or default judgments entered against them.

the

Moreover they also

did not file these motions after the September 23, 1999 hearing and by
the deadline of October 9, 1999 as ordered by Ray Harding Jr.
4.

Appellees incorrectly state that Harding Jr. at the hearing

set aside the default judgments against CNA and EMPIRE and on October
12, 1999 set aside the default of Source One.
OBJECTION:

Judge

Harding

Jr.

only

judgment as to CNA on September 23, 1999.

set

aside

the

default

At this hearing Judge Harding

Jr. instructed EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE'S counsels to file rule 60(b)(1)
motions

by

October

jurisdiction

to

set

9,

1999

aside

so

the

that
default

he

would

judgment

have

subject

against

matter

EMPIRE

[see

exhibit "51" attached to OB] and the default order against SOURCE ONE.
See ex. "31" attached to FAC.
filed

the

deadline.

required

rule

In fact neither EMPIRE nor SOURCE ONE

60(b)(1)

motions

Judge Ray Harding Jr. LIED

by

the

October

9,

1999

in his October 12, 1999 order,

ruling no. 6, when he stated that EMPIRE had filed the required motion
to grant EMPIRE relief from a default judgment [See ex. "30" attached to
OB.];

EMPIRE never filed any such motion and the docket verifies that

no such motion was filed by EMPIRE.
authority

to grant

Source

One

sua

Moreover Ray Harding Jr had no
sponte

relief

from

a default

judgment without SOURCE ONE's filing of the required motion.

ox

Ray Harding

Jr. failed to acquire subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the default
judgment against EMPIRE [ex. "51" attached to O.B.] and the default and
proposed sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE [ex(s) "56" &
"57" attached to O.B.].
5.
to

dismiss

Appellees state that Ray Harding Jr.
on

January

25,

2000

[in written

granted CNA'S motion

order

on

February

18,

2000] and Source One's motion to quash on March 7, 2000.
OBJECTION:
facts.

This

Specifically,

statement

omits

other

pertinent

material

Appellees fail to acknowledge that the basis for

the dismissals were void and fraudulent.
corruptly held that:

Specifically, Ray Harding Jr

(1) LUNDAHL's mortgage interference claims against

Continental Insurance Company were barred by an unrelated interlocutory
order entered by a federal court dismissing LUNDAHL's claims against an
unrelated
contracts.
Continental

CNA

entity
The

res

Insurance

for

ERISA

judicata
Company

violations
argument

was

not

respecting

was

a party

health

care

also

invalid

because

to

the Utah

federal

action, was not served process in the federal action and never made a
general or special appearance
federal

judgment

could

in the federal action.

not have prejudiced

LUNDAHL's

Therefore the
claims

against

Continental Insurance Company in the action before Harding Jr's court;
i

(2) LUNDAHL had not properly served Source ONE.
and

(3)

On March

15,

2000

Ray

Harding

Jr

This was also a false/
fraudulently

dismissed

5.
It is important to note that Ray Harding Jr conducted no
evidentiary hearing to determine the propriety of LUNDAHL's service on
Source One. Under Utah law, Ray Harding Jr. was required to look to the
documentary evidence on file with the court to determine the propriety
of service and any disputes in the documentary evidence were required to

LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE claiming that LUNDAHL'S claims accrued
during the contract period identified in the December 10, 1995 Accord
and Settlement Agreement. This was also a false statement of fact.*
LUNDAHL'S FAC alleged that Ray Harding Jr had no valid legal
basis to dismiss LUNDAHL's claims against CNA and EMPIRE nor to quash
and dismiss LUNDAHL's claims against SOURCE ONE.
6.

On April 12, 2000 LUNDAHL brought a federal civil rights

action against Ray Harding Jr. claiming that Ray Harding JR. violated
LUNDAHL's

federal

civil

rights

defendants EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE,
entered against

by

adjudicating

equity

claims

on

by vacating the default judgments

EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and by subsequently dismissing

LUNDAHL's claims against all three defendants in interlocutory orders
which Ray Harding Jr refused to certify as final. 7
be determined in LUNDAHL's favor.
A review of the returns of service
on file [ex(s) "52" & "53" attached to OB] prima facially established
the question of propriety of service in LUNDAHL's favor.
Ray Harding
Jr. was therefore barred from quashing said service upon SOURCE ONE
nearly one year after SOURCE ONE was served as he was mandated to
determine any disputes in the documentary evidence in LUNDAHL's favor.
6.
LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE did not commence until April
9, 1996,
9 days after the federal court approved Accord/Settlement
Agreement terminated by it's own terms.
The record shows that EMPIRE
recorded a false assignment document which had been back dated to a date
before the federal court approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement
in order to nullify the settlement agreement for lack of capacity to
contract by EMPIRE. As a matter of law, LUNDAHL had the right to (1)
enforce the federally approved settlement agreement,
(2) charge EMPIRE
with having filed a wrongful lien/encumbrance against LUNDAHL's real
property which stated a false assignment date, ommitted the existence
of the federally approved settlement agreement,
and was not supported
by consideration until April 30, 1996, and;
(3) charge EMPIRE for
emotional and mental distress damages for aiding and abetting a wrongful
foreclosure.
7.
Appellees only identify a portion of the true facts in the
civil rights action LUNDAHL brought against Ray Harding Jr in LUNDAHL I.
The following facts are also material. First, LUNDAHL did not sue Ray
Harding Jr. in his personal capacity for money damages in LUNDAHL I.
Ray Harding Jr. was sued strictly in his official capacity under EX
PARTE YOUNG for declaratory and injunctive relief.
On appeal Ray
Harding Jr fraudulently argued that LUNDAHL sued him personally for
money damages in order to corruptly obtain an appellate judgment in his

7.

Appellees correctly state that on April 24, 2000 LUNDAHL filed

a Notice of Claim against the defendants. On August 8, 2001 LUNDAHL
brought

a

Second

Notice

of

claim

to

include

the

fraud

and

malice

committed by Ray Harding Jr in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I and other
fraud and malice committed by Tronier in other unrelated cases wherein
LUNDAHL sued a CNA merged entity.
OBJECTION:

Appellees fail to acknowledge that on April 13, 2001

LUNDAHL timely filed the underlying action to address the personal fraud
and malice claims presented in her first Notice of claim.

LUNDAHL thep

amended her underlying complaint to include the additional claims made
in her second notice of claim which were directed to the fraud committed
favor. Wiile LUNDAHL argued on appeal that she did not sue Harding Jr.
for Money damages but only sued him to EX PARTE YOUNG relief, the Utah
appellate court completely disregarded LUNDAHL's argument.
In addition
Ray Harding Jr. to fraudulently obstruct LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG claim
on appeal, argued that the challenged interlocutory orders were final
and ready for appeal - thus causing the appellate court to again
disregard LUNDAHL's pleadings and sustain a finding that LUNDAHL was
seeking retrospective relief. Ray Harding Jr never produced evidence to
sustain his defense that his interlocutory orders were final and
appealable, and it is clear that Ray Harding Jr defrauded the trial
court into believing that such interlocutory orders were made final by a
subsequent order issued by Ray Harding Jr.
[See hearing transcript of
oral argument as exhibit "38" attached to OB.]
Harding Jr. also
concealed to the appellate court that LUNDAHL did not have an adequate
remedy in the federal court after the state action had been removed
because the federal action had been ordered indefinitely stayed.
Ray
Harding Jr's false representations resulted in an obstructed and void
appellate
judgment against LUNDAHL. See Appellees Appendix
"A".
Additionally, Appellees fail to acknowledge that LUNDAHL requested
rehearing of the appellate order which was denied.
[See ex. "41"
attached to OB.]
On May 20, 2001 LUNDAHL filed a petition for
certiorari review. [See ex. "1" attached hereto.] The docket in the
appellate case shows that on March 20, 2002 the Supreme Court denied a
petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal and issued a
remittitur. [See exhibit "2" attached hereto.]
A recent review of the
appellate file revealed no such order issued on March 20, 2002 or any
remittitur issued on that same date.
Instead the file erroneously
included an order dated August 21, 2001 denying a petition for
permission to file an interlocutory appeal; an order which belonged in
another case filed by LUNDAHL.
LUNDAHL'S petition for certiorari
review of the May 3, 2001 appellate order has never been adjudicated by
the Utah Supreme Court.

by Ray Harding Jr in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I.

Appellees correctly

state that they objected to the court considering the second notice of
claim because it was merged into an action which had commenced 5 months
earlier on the First Notice of claim and LUNDAHL's merger violated the
procedural requirements for prosecuting an UGIA claim. LUNDAHL argued
that the doctrine of merger and bar required she amend the complaint to
include the second allegations.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Holli

Lundahl

claims

that

Judge

Harding

Jr.

violated

the

jurisdictional statutes under URCP rule 60(b)(1) with respect to EMPIRE
and

SOURCE

ONE

and

thereby

entered

defaults/judgments against these defendants r

void

orders

vacating

that Harding Jr's clerk

Tronier should have entered the sum certain default judgment against
SOURCE ONE under URCP rule 55(b)(1), and that Tronier should have
entered defaults against LILLY,

Advanced Cardiovascular Systems and

Leahy in case number 990403068 under URCP rule 55(a).
LUNDAHL contends that the entry of a default judgment for sums
certain pled in a complaint and or supported by affidavit under rule
55(b) (1) is a ministerial act.

LUNDAHL further contends that she stated

a valid legal basis for obtaining default judgments against all three
defendants.

The record shows that Mike Tronier and Ray Harding Jr

engaged in a fraudulent and malicious conspiracy with attorneys for the
defendants to claim:

(1)

that LUNDAHL's claims against EMPIRE were

barred by the federally approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement,
(2) that LUNDAHL was not entitled to a default judgment against CNA as

8
LUNDAHL's
and

claims

against CNA were allegedly barred by res judicata

(3) that LUNDAHL had not properly served SOURCE ONE

;

,

thereby

justifying Tronier's failure to enter the sum certain default judgment
LUNDAHL submitted to TRONIER.
The

record

shows

that Appellees

either the trial court or this court
subject matter

jurisdiction

made no effort

to argue in

that Ray Harding Jr acted without

to grant EMPIRE or SOURCE ONE equitable

relief from the final defaults/judgments; thus rendering Ray Harding
Jr A s

equity

orders

VOID

and

subject

to

collateral

attack

in

any

proceeding.
In addition the defendants failed to acknowledge that LUNDAHL is
unable to appeal the removed interlocutory orders in the federal court
due to an indefinate stay order; thus leaving LUNDAHL with her federal
remedy under the EX PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE.
deprive

LUNDAHL

of

her

state

civil

rights

Neverthless this did not
remedy

under

the

Utah

Governmental Immunity Act.
The trial court was not without subject matter jurisdiction to
hear LUNDAHL's UGIA claims presented in second Notice of claim because
8. Harding Jr concluded that LUNDAHL's claims before his court
for mortgage interference, insurance bad faith, fiduciary fraud, etc.
against Continental Insurance Company, LUNDAHL's
homeowners insurer,
which accrued on December 13, 1996, were identical to claims LUNDAHL
had pending before the Utah federal court against an ERISA health
contract insurer known as Continental Assurance Company which accrued on
July 23, 1993.
9.
To avoid entry of LUNDAHL^ submitted default judgment
against SOURCE ONE, Ray Harding Jr sua sponte quashed LUNDAHL's service
upon this defendant falsely claiming it was improper.
Ray Harding Jr
violated the common law rules respecting challenges to service of
process which required that any dispute in documentary evidence go in
favor of the plaintiff. Moreover SOURCE ONE did not provide competent
evidence to dispute LUNDAHL's service returns as to SOURCE ONE. Finally
SOURCE ONE did not file any rule 60(b)(1) motion to challenge the
sufficiency of service of process within the time allowed under Utah
even though Ray Hardin Jr had twiced petitioned SOURCE ONE to do so
within the 3 month limitations period.

under the doctrine of merger and bar LUNDAHL had an obligation to merge
her claims and by the time the trial court ruled as to this defense the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction was mooted.
Under

the

UGIA,

judicial immunity.
by

res

judicata by

neither

defendants

are

entitled

to

personal

LUNDAHL's claims against Harding Jr are not barred
LUNDAHL

I because

of

the fraud Ray Harding

Jr.

committed in the prosecution of LUNDAHL I and because the administrative
process was not completed to permit the trial court to acquire subject
matter jurisdiction over LUNDAHLxs UGIA claim.
process in LUNDAHL I

Moreover the appellate

is still ongoing and has never reached a valid,

final or competent disposition of the* violations committed in LUNDAHL I
as

contemplated

in

the

statutory

scheme.

Finally

plaintiffs

against Mike Tronier are not barred by collateral estoppel

claims

because (1)

the defendants did not raise this dcsfense in the lower court

(2) Mike

Tronier was not named a party r was not served process and did not appear
in LUNDAHL I,

and (3) LUNDAHL's claims against Tronier were never fully

and fairly litigated in LUNDAHL I.

ARGUMENT
H.

LUNDAHL DID NOT FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
A.

HARDING JR. DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
TO VACATE THE DEFAULTS/JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST
EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE

APPELLEES

claim

that

LUNDAHL's

entitlement

to

a

sum

certain

default judgment against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE was not a ministerial act
of Tronier's office.
Appellees quote to a common law authority supporting the right to
relief from a default when a timely motion is made under rule 60(b)(1)
in re Heathman V. Fabian

& Cledenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190

(1962), I.e.

"that default judgments are not favored. . .and when a timely motion under
rule

60(b) (1) is filed,

action on it's merits."

the court

should grant relief and hear

the

However in the case at bar, neither EMPIRE

nor SOURCE ONE filed timely motions under rule 60(b)(1).

"Utah courts

do

employed

not

recognize

distinctions between

relief procedures

obtain relief from defaults or default judgments".

to

Heber v. U.S.A., 145

F.R.D. 576 (D. Utah 1992) citing to Moore's Federal Practice 3d section
60.22 [3] [b] .

"In both instances defendants are required to file motions

to set aside the default or default judgment." Id at 577.
file

the

judgment

required
or

motion

proceeding,

within

3 months

deprives

the

of
court

the

"Failure to

challenged

of

subject

order,
matter

jurisdiction to grant any relief."

Richman v. Delbert Chipman & Sons

Co.,

1991) (citing to URCP rule

817 P.2d

Moreover

rule

382, 387
"60(b)(1)

(Utah App.
only

permits

relief

if

demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense."
F2d 1316, 1319

(10th Cir. 1978) .

the

60(b).

movant

can

In re Stone, 588

Also "a primary factor in setting a

default or judgment aside is whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced."
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con. Inc., 544 P2d 876, 879
hn 3 (Utah 1980).
Here neither EMPIRE or SOURCE ONE filed the required motions under
rule

60 (b) to obtain

defenses.

relief... likely because they had no meritorious

In addition LUNDAHL was severely prejudiced by the vacatior*

of the judgments not only because the acts were prohibited under the
jurisdictional

rules

of

60(b)(1)

but

also

because

EMPIRE

was

in

dissolution and there was no means by which to obtain enforcement of any
money judgment against EMPIRE unless LUNDAHL obtained the money judgment
before the dissolution was complete.
10.

10

EMPIRE has now dissolved

With respect to SOURCE ONE,
thereby leaving LUNDAHL's only

LUNDAHL has now been forced to file bankruptcy proceedings to stave off
11
Creditors related to her home illegally stolen by SOURCE ONE.
Not surprisingly, the defendants have not addressed Ray Harding
Jr's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the equity proceedings as to
EMPIRE

and

SOURCE,

nor

did

they

attack

this

established

factual

contention in the trial court.

Appellees have therefore conceded that

the

vacating

October

12,

1999

order

LUNDAHL's

defaults/judgments

against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE are void. Being VOID LUNDAHL is entitled
to collaterally attack them in these proceedings.

B.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT WHEN A
PLAINTIFF SUBMITS A SUM CERTAIN DEFAULT JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 55(B) (1) AND REQUESTS ENTRY FROM A CLERK,
THE CLERK PERFORMS A MINISTERIAL DUTY IN ENTERING
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Attached hereto as exhibit "69" is the only Utah Supreme Court
authority opining duties under URCP rule 55(b)(1) in re Utah Ass'n of
Credit Men v. Bowman, 113 P 63 (Utah 1911) .
fact pattern as the case at bar,

A clerk in an identical

entered a default but refused to enter

a default judgment in plaintiff's favor based upon sum certain damages
pled in plaintiff's complaint.

The clerk,

likened to the case at bar,

forwarded the default judgment onto the judge who then refused to order
the clerk to enter the default judgment.

A writ was filed to the Utah

Supreme

the ministerial

Court

to

compel

performance

of

duty.

The

Supreme Court decisioned that it was not an answer to the writ that the
judge directed the clerk not to perform her duties, [hn.4].
Court

also held

that when

a

complaint

states

a

sum

The High

certain

damage

supported by admissible evidence and the defendant does not respond, the
remedy as an action against the defendant
obstruction of LUNDAHL's right to obtain and
against EMPIRE.
11.
In addition failure to enter judgment
resulted in multiple lawsuits being filed against

Ray Harding
enforce her

Jr. for
judgment

against SOURCE ONE has
Holli Lundahl.

defendant makes a tacit admission, as in a judgment by confession, that
the cause sued upon is valid and that the money damages claimed are
owed. Id at 67.

Furthermore the court directly decisioned:

"The only difference in entering a judgment
by confession and a judgement by default
...is that in the first instance the defendant
in proper terms confesses the judgment
while in the second he tacitly consents by his
silence that the judgment may be entered against
him for the amount claimed in the complaint.
IN ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREFORE, IN EITHER CASE,
THE CLERK ACTS MERELY MINISTERIALLY, AND WITH
EITHER THE EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED CONSENT OF THE
DEFENDANT." ID at 67.
The

appellees

argue

that

entering

a

default

judgment

is

4

discretionary judicial function because a court is required to confirm
whether the facts set forth in the complaint support the legal claims,
citing

to

Pennington,

etc.

None

of

the

cases

cited by

appellees

involved a complaint which had attached thereto admissible

documents

establishing the plaintiff's claims as a matter of law or pleaded sum
certain and statutory damages, likened

to the case at bar.

On the

contrary, the case to which appellees cite involved an action where the
plaintiff

was

found

to have pursued a bad

faith breach of contract

action against his car insurance company for failure to pay medical
expenses in excess of his policy limits. .

The plaintiff did not admit

in his initial complaint that he himself had breached his own insurance
contract before his carrier did.

The court sanctioned the plaintiff

$25,000

bringing

in

attorneys

fee

for

the

bad

faith

action.

Furthermore the plaintiff in Pennington petitioned the court, not the
clerk, UNDER RULE

55(B)(2)

to enter default

judgment. That case and

others cited by Appellees are therefore distinguishable.
In Harding's court, LUNDAHL petitioned the clerk for entry of sum
certain default

judgments

against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE.

LUNDAHL'S

factual allegations and causes of action were fully supported by th§
necessary

contracts,

public

recording

testimony and discovery documents.

documents,

previous

trial

Under rule 55(b)(1), LUNDAHL had

the statutory right to make her submissions for default judgments to the
clerk considering the fixed nature of LUNDAHL As facts and claims.

The

clerk had no authority to deny LUNDAHL entry of the sum certain default
judgments, especially when LUNDAHL'S judgments on their face contained
sufficient

admitted

facts,

set

forth

the

legal

claims under

which

LUNDAHL grounded her entitlements, and set forth authorized liquidated
damages. [See exhibit "51" attached to OB for Empire's Judgment.]
ex. "57 attached to OB for SOURCE ONE'S judgment.]
defendants

questioned

the

propriety

of

the

12

[See

If the defaulted

judgments,

there

was

a

statutory scheme available to the defaulted to obtain relief, if timely
made.

It is a safe presumption that if the defendant does not obtain

timely

relief

from

a default

judgment,

especially

when

given

clear

advance notice and opportunity to obtain relief by the court as in the
case at bar,

the defendants conceded that the judgments were based upon

13
valid claims.

III.

LUNDAHL IS ENTITLED TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK VOID
INTERLOCATORY ORDERS IN ANY CASE AND IN ANY PROCEEDING

12.
SEE ADDENDUM "A" attached hereto for a factual and legal
synopsis establishing the validity of LUNDAHL'S claims against EMPIRE
and SOURCE ONE.
13.
Restated,
on August 13, 1999 Judge Harding Jr. ordered
CNA, EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE to appear at the September 23, 1999 by proper
motion under rule 60(b).
When these defendants counsels failed to
properly appear,
Judge Harding Jr. again ordered EMPIRE and SOURCE
ONE'S counsels to file the required motions by October 9, 1999 to give
the court subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief. Still these
defendants did not comply.
It therefore cannot be said that these
defendants did not effectively consent that LUNDAHL had stated proper
claims against them.

Appellees falsely claim that LUNDAHL's entire action is an effort
by LUNDAHL to relitigate valid and final decisions from prior lawsuits
to which

LUNDAHL

INTERLOCATORY
FINAL.

disagreed

DECISIONS

with

the

results.

IN TRUTH,

THE

LUNDAHL ATTACKS WERE NOT VALID AND WERE NOT

The Utah courts have long held that where the record shows that

a judgment was entered without subject matter or personal jurisdiction,
the judgment is void and may be collaterally attacked anywhere and at
anytime. Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (1946) .

Here the claim is that

Ray Harding Jr. vacated default judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE
without

subject

matter

jurisdiction;

thus

permitting

LUNDAHL

to

collaterally attack Ray Harding Jr's rulings in any proceeding.
Appellees

next claim

that no trial judge has the authority to

alter decisions alleged to be erroneous [or in this case void] , even if
the decisions are interlocutory,

citing to Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P2d

1132 (1977) which is based upon the law of the case doctrine.

14

Aside

from the fact that the defendants waived this argument in the trial
court and therefore should not be permitted to raise it on appeal,

the

law of the case doctrine has no application to the case at bar as it
requires the same action to impose the rule.

The underlying action is a

different action naming different parties.
Appellees next cite to inapplicable state authority

Collins v.

Sandy City Bd. Of Adjustments, 52 P.3d 1267, holding that a plaintiff
who fails to appeal a final decision cannot normally collaterally attack
that decision

in a new

action.

This authority

is also

inapplicable

because there are no final decisions at issue which permitted LUNDAHL
access to an appeal. Next the appellees cite to Supreme Court authority
14.
However,
the law of the case doctrine has evolved and the
Utah appellate courts now hold,
"Not withstanding the law of the case
doctrine, a trial court is not inexorably bound it's own precedents."
Jones Constructors, 761 P2d at 45.
"A judge or co-ordinate sitting

in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US 477 (1994)
is overturned or otherwise declared
defendant

has

inapplicable

no

cognizable

because

the

holding that unless a conviction
invalid by an appellate court, a

section

1983

challenged

claim.

orders

did

This
not

authority

derive

is

from

a

criminal conviction and LUNDAHL has never had the opportunity to appeal
the

challenged

interlocutory

orders.

The

Correct

rule

of

law

applicable to the question of collateral attack on interlocutory orders
is

the EX PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE. 209 US 123

(1908).

This doctrine

specifically permits a suit against a judge in his official capacity for
prospective equitable relief to remedy

14th amendment violations;

such

as

void

that

those

that might be presented

represent an imminent

by

interlocutory

orders

and irreparable harm to a litigant.

Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, fn. 1 (10th Cir. 2001).

Smith v.

As previously stated,

the interlocutory orders represent imminent and ongoing harm to LUNDAHL.
While

LUNDAHL

once

before

sought

relief

under

this

doctrine,

Ray

Harding Jr. corrupted the process through his continued fraud committed
at all levels of the trial and appellate proceedings.
argue

that

since

LUNDAHL

lost

her

statutory

Appellees falsely

review

proceedings

in

LUNDAHL I, LUNDAHL should be barred from filing the underlying action.
In fact LUNDAHL has not lost the appellate proceedings in LUNDAHL I
because

LUNDAHL's

disposed.

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari

has

never

[See Lundahl's motion filed in appeal proceedings

been

case no.

20010049 to dispose of LUNDAHL's petition for writ of certiorari.]
Appellees

also

purport

to

hold

LUNDAHL

responsible

for

this

court's or the federal court's failure to overturn the challenged orders
judge is tree to change a ruling until a final decision as been formally
rendered. URCP rule 54(b). Ron Shepard Inc. v. Shields, 882 P2d 650,
652-654 (Utah 1994).

by deceptively
orders

claiming

into question

Court.

that LUNDAHL did not attempt

to bring these

in the action formerly before Ray Harding Jr's

This statement is a blatant lie.

A review of the court docket

in re case no. 990402021 shows that LUNDAHL filed a rule 54(b) motion
for certification which Harding Jr. refused.

LUNDAHL then requested

interlocutory review under rule 5. This was denied by the Utah Supreme
Court in 2000. [See ex. ' 35" attached to OB.]

LUNDAHL also requeste4

review by extraordinary writ and this was rejected in 2000. LUNDAHL then
sought her federal remedy under EX PARTE YOUNG.

This was obstructed

because Ray Harding Jr lied to the trial court in those proceedings by
falsely

representing

that

the

challenged

orders

were

final

and

immediately subject to appeal through the normal processes. Ray Harding
Jr then continued to perpetrate his fraud upon the appellate court by
asserting that the orders were final and subject to immediate appeal in
the federal court resulting in an obstructed and void appellate order.
Now 31/2 years later LUNDAHL seeks her federal and state remedies for
Harding

Jr's

performance

gross

fraud

and

malice

in

the

performance

of his duties. The defendants petition

or

non-

to this court to

affirm the dismissal of LUNDAHL's underlying action on the basis of an
alleged

impermissible

denied.

Furthermore the appellees fraud and malice with respect to the

challenged

orders has

collateral

attack

lacks

merit

never been previously heard

and

should

in any forum

be

and

therefore cannot be precluded from being heard in this forum«

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTON TO HEAR
LUNDAHL'S ALLEGATIONS OF INTEFERENCE WITH AN ACTION BEFORE JUDGE
HOWARDS COURT

Appellees

argue

that

because

LUNDAHL

did

interference claims in her original notice of claim,

not

raise

the trial

her
n.wr*

was without jurisdiction to consider the interference claims. Appellees
then argue Notice requirements under the UGIA.

LUNDAHL concedes that

Appellees are correct about the notice requirements.

However on page

14, para. 3, Appellees admit that LUNDAHL filed a second Notice of claim
including

the

additional

allegations

regarding

interference

with

proceedings before Howard's Court. Appellees complain that LUNDAHL filed
her first Amended Complaint including the new allegations in the Scond
Notice of Claim,
state.

before

the 90 days for review had expired by the

Appellees than argue that "plaintiff failed to show that the

second notice of claim was ever denied" [an implied requirement before
proceeding on an action under the UGIA. }
prematurely filed her FAC.

LUNDAHL concedes that she

However after the FAC was filed, the 90 days

had expired, and in support of LUNDAHL'S REPLY papers, LUNDAHL filed a
declaration with the court attesting that the second notice of claim was
effectively denied when the state failed to respond by November 6, 2001
and therefore any jurisdictional defect was cured.

In the alternative

LUNDAHL requested that the court refile her FAC and responses to a date
after November 6, 2001 to permit merger of her claims.

The Court chose

not to do so. LUNDAHL contends that the defect became moot by the time
the court issued its order on December 10, 2001. If this Court should
concur with the trial c o u r t s ruling, it was nevertheless clear error
for

the trial

court

to have dismissed

the claims subject matter

of

LUNDAHL's second notice of claim with prejudice on the grounds of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.

See URCP rule 41(b) - dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice.

V.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST HARDING JR AND TRONIER ARE NOT
BARRED BY ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

A.

THE APPELLEES ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY JUDICIALLY IMMUNED UNDER THE
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

THE

FACTS

STATED

against Harding
matter

BY APPELLEES

ARE

FALSE.

Plaintiff's

Jr are based upon Harding Jr acting without

jurisdiction

defaults/judgments

and

fraudulently

and

maliciously

claims
subject

vacating

against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and fraudulently and

maliciously dismissing LUNDAHL's claims against CNA as barred by res
judicata.

LUNDAHL's claims against TRONIER is based upon his failure to

enter a sum certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE in case no.
990402021 and defaults and sum certain default judgments against LILLY,
Advanced

Cardiovascular

Systems and Leahy in case no. 990403068

for

specifically pled equitable relief. LUNDAHL's FAC clearly alleged the
jurisdictional

defect

on

Harding

JR's

equity

rulings

and

TRONIERxs

ministerial violations. Appellees claim that LUNDAHL's claims against
TRONIER

was mooted by

Harding

Jr's decisions

to vacate

the default

judgments against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and hence argue this defense as
to Harding jr only.
Appellees argue a plethora of federal civil rights cases standing
for the correct legal proposition that a judge cannot be sued for money
damages unless "the court's subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed
by

statute

(1978)],

or case

law,"

[See Stump v. Sparkman,

435 US 349, hn c

or the court acts in a non-judicial manner.

LUNDAHL agrees.

In the case at bar however Harding JR's sub ject matter jurisdiction over
the

defaults/default

circumscribed

by

judgments

statute

and

by

of
case

EMPIRE
law

and
under

SOURCE
rule

ONE

60(b)(1)

was
and

Richins, supra, because EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE never filed the required
motions to give Harding Jr subject matter jurisdiction.

Therefore he

was not protected by absolute judicial immunity under the federal civil

rights

act.

Nevertheless

damages under

LUNDAHL did not sue Harding

the federal civil

rights act.

Jr for money

LUNDAHL'S

suit against

Harding Jr under the federal civil rights act was limited solely to EX
The 10th circuit in re

PARTE YOUNG declaratory and injunctive relief.
Smith v. Plati, 258 F3d 1167, fn 1
established

rule

(10th Cir. 2001) held to the long

that a state official

can be

sued in his

official

capacity for prospective equitable* relief to remedy violations to the
Constitution or other federal laws citing to EX PARTE YOUNG, 209 US 123
(1908).

Because Harding Jr violated LUNDAHL'S

be free from deprivation of property
without

due process

of

law

14th amendment right to

[a cause of action is property]

and because

Harding

Jr's violations

ongoing and continue to inflict prospective harm upon LUNDAHL.
the doctrine,

are

Under

LUNDAHL was entitled to decrees declaring the October 12,

1999 order VOID as to EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and the February 18, 2000
order

void

as

to

CNA.

LUNDAHL

was

also

entitled

to

a

permanent

injunction order compelling reinstatement of the defaults and default
judgments against EMPIRE AND SOURCE ONE as a matter of law and to a jury
trial of LUNDAHL 7 s claims against CNA.

B.

APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY
JUDICIALLY IMMUNED UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
All of the state and federal authorities cited by appellees deal

solely with immunities
APPELLEES
PERSONAL

HAVE

NOT

IMMUNITIES

uncontested

that

available under the federal civil rights act.

ARGUED
UNDER

the Utah

AND

THEREFORE

HAVE

WAIVED

THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
Governmental

Immunity

ANY

IMMUNITY

CLAIM

TO

ACT. It is

Act waives

personal

immunity for officials of the state if they act with fraud and malice in
the performance or non-performance of their duties.

U.C.A. section

63-30-4(3) (b) ;
The

record

Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 136

shows

that

Harding

Jr

acted

with

(UT App. 1995).

malice

in

vacating

defaults/judgments entered against EMPIRE and SOURCE because he acted in
reckless disregard of the law and LUNDAHL's legal rights on matters for
which he had no subject matter jurisdiction.

Moreover Harding Jr could

not claim any misconduct on the part of LUNDAHL that led to EMPIRE and
SOURCE ONE'S defaults because Judge Harding Jr. himself twice ordered
EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE to file the required motions to give his court
subject matter

jurisdiction

against

and

EMPIRE

defendants

twice

SOURCE

chose

to vacate
ONE

with

on

the defaults/judgments

July

9,

deliberation

1999.

not

to

These
file

entered

defaulting

the

required

motions within the statutory time periods.

On October 12, 1999,

overcome the jurisdictional defect, Harding Jr

executed a deceptive and

fraudulent

interlocutory

order

whereby

he

falsely

represented

to

that

EMPIRE had filed the required motion and that he was granting relief to
SOURCE ONE sua sponte.

He also vacated the default against CNA which

was a legally permissible given CNA did file the required motion within
the time allowed by law.

However Harding Jr's malice and fraud did not

stop there. On October 12, 1999 when he vacated the judgments against
EMPIRE,

SOURCE

ONE

and

CNA,

he

also

ordered

the parties

responses within 30 days to LUNDAHL's Verified FAC.

to file

Again the only

party to file a response was CNA who fraudulently claimed that LUNDAHL's
claims before Harding Jrs court relating to the wrongful foreclosure of
her home,

were identical to the Anti trust and police brutality claims

subject matter of a Utah federal action. 16

On February 18, 2000 Ray

16.
During the prosecution of CNA's motion to dismiss, LUNDAHL
provided Harding Jr's court with commercial publications showing that
CNA Financial Corporation was the surviving corporation to a merger with
over 120 companies formerly belonging to Continental Corporation and for
which Continental Insurance Company and Continental Assurance Company

Harding Jr not only maliciously and fraudulently barred LUNDAHL claims
before his court but based upon the global and broad nature of his
order, Harding Jr barred LUNDAHL from bringing any claim against any CNA
related

entity

forevermore.

QMA

then

subsequently

presented

this

corrupted order to every court wherein LUNDAHL and a CNA entity were
named parties.
Jr

then

Morover to further maliciously injure LUNDAHL, Harding

subsequently

dismissed

LUNDAHL's

claims

against

EMPIRE

as

covered by the federally approved December 10, 1995 settlement agreement
and unilaterally quashed service of LUNDAHL's process upon SOURCE ONE by
falsely claiming that LUNDAHL had improperly served SOURCE ONE. After
these dispositions, there were no remaining claims against CNA, EMPIRE
or SOURCE ONE.

LUNDAHL moved for rule 54(b) certification which Harding

denied. LUNDAHL sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal which
was

denied

by

the

Utah

relief which was denied.

Supreme

Court.

LUNDAHL

sought

extraordinary

LUNDAHL'S action was then improperly removed

to the federal court, ordered consolidated and then indefinitely stayed.
In the meantime:

(1) some of LUNDAHL's unrelated claims against other

unrelated CNA entities were dismissed as barred under res

judicata by

Harding Jr's interlocutory order [It should be noted that LUNDAHL still
has two state actions pending against unrelated CNA merged corporation
parties which LUNDAHL has not yet served CNA to avoid the corrupt effect
of Harding Jrs void interlocutory order; hence these state cases are in
limbo.]

(2) LUNDAHL has filed bankruptcy to avoid creditors created by

were separate merged corporation parties insuring different legal
interests.
LUNDAHL provided Harding Jr's court with the homeowners
insurance policy at issue before Harding Jr's Court and the ACS ERISA
health plan document which Continental Assurance Company insured in the
federal court.
LUNDAHL testified that the injuries in Harding Jr's
Court and the injuries in the federal action were completely different,
the transactions and contracts at issue were unrelated, the causes
accrued at the very least 4 years apart from each other, no evidence was
alike, and the parties were not the same nor in privity with one
another.

the theft of her home by SOURCE ONE and a number of these creditors have
filed

adversary

proceedings

against

LUNDAHL,

and

(3)

EMPIRE

has

undergone dissolution making payment of the judgment impossible.
Under the UGIA,

there were no legal justifications for Harding

Jr's fraudulent and malicious conduct towards LUNDAHL and under the UGIA
LUNDAHL is entitled to money damages as a matter of law.
With respect to TRONIER, he fraudulently refused to enter the sum
certain default judgment against SOURCE ONE under URCP rule 55(b)(1).
Hence if this court does not reinstate the default judgment against
SOURCE ONE, Tronier

along with Harding Jr should be held

liable to

LUNDAHL for the judgment amount therein stated as well as any additional
actual,

special

and/or punitive damages

LUNDAHL might be

therefore

entitled.

Vi

LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST RAY HARDING JR ARE NOT BARRED BY
RES JUDICATA IN LUNDAHL I
HARDING JR claims that LUNDAHL's claims against Harding JR are

barred by the prosecution of LUNDAHL I.

First, LUNDAHL I only sued

Judge Harding

The underlying action sues

in his official capacity.

Judge Harding Jr. in his personal capacity.

The federal and state

courts generally hold that a subsequent action that sues the defendant
in a different capacity as the prior action, does not bar prosecution of
the

second

claim.

Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d

VanSickle v. Halloway,
LUNDAHL

could

not have

791 F2d 1431
included her

841

(Wyo. 1979);

(10th Cir. 1986).
state

law claims

Also

In addition,
in

the prior

federal action because the administrative process had not completed on
the federal claims. See Havercombe v. Dept. of Ed., 250 F.3d 1, fn 9
(1st Cir. 2001)

citing

to exceptions

in the claim spitting rule in

Restatement

(Second)

of

Judgments

section

26, cmt

c

("where formal

barriers existed against full presentation in the first action/' such as
where subject matter jurisdiction is limited in the court of the first
action thus preventing plaintiff from relying on a theory of law or a
form of remedy) or, id., cmt j (where the defendant has committed fraud
in the prosecution of the first action by concealing material evidence).
Respecting

the

first

exception

above

stated,

LUNDAHL

argued

in her

opening brief that she could not prosecute her state law UGIA claims in
the EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory/injunction action because the tribunal in
the EX PARTE YOUNG action lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
LUNDAHL'S UGIA claims until the administrative process had completed. 17
In

response

waited

thereto,

to file her

Judge

federal

Harding
civil

argues

that

LUNDAHL

rights action until

claims became actionable. However as set forth supra,

should

have

the state law

LUNDAHL stood in

risk of not being able to recover her damages against EMPIRE due to
dissolution,

LUNDAHL was attempting to prevent multiple lawsuits from

being prosecuted against her by creditors on her home which had been
admittedly

stolen by

effect

Harding' s void

of

SOURCE

ONE,

res

and

LUNDAHL needed

judicata

ruling

as

to nullify

the

to CNA before

CNA

successfully used this fraudulent ruling to obstruct the prosecution of
7 other unrelated actions

against other CNA merged entities pending

before 7 different federal and state courts.
no.

20010845,

LUNDAHL

v.

HOTSY,

et

al

[See pending appeal case

where

CNA

successfully

used

17. Harding Jr. has deferred to federal court decisions holding
that it was not necessary to obtain a right to sue letter from a state
agency in order for a Title IV federal civil rights court to hear
plaintiff's state law civil law civil rights claims. First Harding Jr
appears to want his cake and eat it to as he has argued that LUNDAHL
should not be able to proceed on the claims presented in her second
notice of claim because LUNDAHL filed an amended complaint joining the
allegations of the second notice of claim,
before the state of Utah
issued a denial letter on the claims presented in the second notice.

Harding Jr.'s interlocutory order as res judicata bar to the prosecution
of an automobile personal injury action.]

The Utah Supreme Court in

Nebecker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180, 184 (UT
2001)

citing

parties

to well

should

established

exhaust

law affirmed

administrative

"As

remedies

a general
before

rule

bringing

constitutional claims... However exceptions to this rule exist in unusual
circumstances where
oppression

or

unconscionable

it appears

injustice
not

to

is

that there is a likelihood

or

review

will
the

occur

alleged

such

that

grievance

it

that some
would

be

immediately.")

LUNDAHL met these exceptional circumstances.
With regards to the second contention, Ray Harding Jr committed
fraud in both the trial court and the appellate court in the prosecution
of

LUNDAHL

I by

concealing

a very material

fact

to wit:

that

the

challenged orders were not final but were interlocutory thereby barring
LUNDAHL from seeking EX PARTE YOUNG prospective declaratory/ injunctive
relief.

Not

only

does

Harding

Jr's

commission

of

fraud

application of res judicata in accordance with Restatement

bar

the

(Second) of

Judgments, cmt f because the prior court was unable to yield a coherent
disposition of LUNDAHL's EX PARTE YOUNG claim due to Harding Jrs fraud,
IB. Black7 s law dictionary defines fraud by a state official as
"a misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in it's truth to
induce another person [public officer or member] to act."
The
definition cites to 10th circuit authority, Chesholm v. House, 160 F2d
632 (10th Cir. 1947) (fraud by an official occurs when official executes
reports [or in the instance of a judge - orders] , which are false and
misleading, with knowledge that the orders will inflict unjustified or
unauthorized injury upon a person subject to the report or order.)
Fraud on the court is defined by Black's law dictionary as serious
misconduct in a proceeding as committed by an officer of the court such
that the integrity of the judicial process is undermined. Legal and
constructive fraud is defined as unintentional or intentional deception
that causes injury to another.
Malice by an official is defined as
"'reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights."
Deception and misrepresentation is defined as creating or confirming by
words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false... and that is
likely to effect the judgment of another in the transaction.

but also because Restatement (Second) of Judgments, cmt d [exhibit "66"
attached to OB] precludes res judicata when the judgment in the first
action

was

plainly

implementation

of a

inconsistent
statutory

[Refer back to exhibits 1-2

with

scheme

the

[here

fair

and

the appellate

equitable
scheme] .

attached hereto for showing that even the

appellate courts committed due process errors in addressing the claims
in LUNDAHL I]. As stated in Montana v. United States, 440 US 147, 164,
no. 11, 99 S Ct 970, 979 n.ll, 59 L Ed 2d 210 (1979), the high court
held that "If there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness or
fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation, redetermination of
issues and claims are warranted."
and

were

clearly

interlocutory.

Finally, the challenged orders are
Utah

Courts

have

long held

that

interlocutory orders are not entitled to res judicata or law of the case
effect. Cf Richardson v. Grand Central ., 572 P.2d 396,397 (Utah 1977).

VTL

LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST MIKE TRONIER ARE NOT BARRED BY
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND FURTHER THE APPELLEES WAIVED
THE RIGHT TO RAISE THIS DEFENSE ON APPEAL
TRONIER did not raise the defense of collateral estoppel in the

lower court action and should not be permitted to argue this defense on
appeal. "Issues not raised in trial court may not be raised on appeal."
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444

(Utah 1995).

In addition issue

preclusion could not otherwise apply because Tonier was not made a party
to LUNDAHL I, Harding Jr was not sued in Tronier's capacity as a clerk
for failing to perform statutory duties under URCP rule 55(b)(1) and
55(a), the issues of Tronier's failures to perform certain statutory
duties was never litigated in LUNDAHL I, Harding Jr committed fraud upon
the

trial

and

appellate

courts

in

obstruction would translate to Tronier,

LUNDAHL

I and

therefore

such

and LUNDAHL could not present

all of her claims in LUNDAHL I.
consider

much

less

affirm

a

Based thereon, this court should not

dismissal

of

LUNDAHL's

claims

against

Tronier on this ground.

VIII

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, this Court should reverse the trial

court's dismissal order, find the underlying complaint not barred under
the

theory

estoppel,

of

collateral

find

immunity,

LUNDAHL's

find

the

attack, by
action

acts

res

not

under

judicata or by

barred

the

by

subject

collateral

absolute
matter

judicial

jurisdiction

provisions of rule 60(b) (1), and the default functions under rules 55(a)
and

(b) (1) ministerial,

ministerial

duties

and

find
acted

appellees

with

failed

to performed

fraud and malice, find

personally liable to LUNDAHL as a matter of law,

their

appellees

grant LUNDAHL's claim

for EX PARTE YOUNG declaratory and injunctive relief and reinstate the
default

judgments

entered against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE, vacate the

dismissal order as to CNA, remand this action to the trial court with
permission to add CNA as a party,
against

CNA

on

the

merits

under

allow LUNDAHL to prosecute her claims
the

claims presented

in case no.

990402021 and as a joint conspirator with Harding Jr and Tronier, and
order that this case be sent to a jury for a trial on the damages
incurred after the EX PARTE YOUNG relief granted by this court.
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APPENDIX "A"
The verified FAC in re 990402021 showed that LUNDAHL sued EMPIRE for:
wrongful lien; RICE violations for fiduciary fraud, recording of a false
instrument & communications Fraud;
emotional and mental distress; a
declaration that the December 10, 1995 Settlement Contract was valid anc|i
enforceable; attorneys fees and contractual prejudgment interest.
All,
that LUNDAHL needed to prove was that:
<1) an encumbrance operating as
a lien was recorded against LUNDAHL's property, (2) the encumbrance/lien
contained false information; (3) the false information was communicated
to LUNDAHL and others;
(4) the fraudulent scheme would likely deprive
LUNDAHL of valuable properties; and (5) [in the case of wrongful lien}
LUNDAHL
was
actually
injured
by
recordation
of
the
false
encumbrance/lien.
LUNDAHL in her judgments specifically identified her
causes of actions against EMPIRE and SOURCE ONE and the admitted facts
which would support her causes of actions.
[Refer to ex. "51" attached
to OB for true and correct copy of EMPIRES' judgment.] The established
facts in EMPIRE'S Judgment showed that: (1) EMPIRE assigned all rights,
obligations, interests, benefits, duties and liabilities under LUNDAHL's
mortgage contract to SOURCE ONE on April 9, 1996, (2) EMPIRE cashed
LUNDAHL's April 1996 mortgage payment before assignment, (3) all of
LUNDAHL's mortgage duties under the First Note and Trust Deed were
current to the date of April 30, 1996,
(4) the December 10, 1995
settlement agreement was valid and enforceable;
(5) On April 9, 1996
EMPIRE recorded a wrongful lien against LUNDAHL's property by filing an
assignment contract which had been fraudulently backdated to the date of
October 30, 1995, which was not then supported by any consideration,
and which was an endeavor to invalidate the settlement contract approved
as valid and final by a California federal Court;
(6) the recording of
the false and void assignment contract ultimately resulted in actual
damages to LUNDAHL as it was
instrumental in obtaining a wrongful
foreclosure against LUNDAHL's real property in December of 1996; (7) the
filing and recording of the false assignment contract constituted a
material breach of LUNDAHL's settlement contract, was a wrongful lien
under the Utah wrongful lien act,
and constituted fiduciary fraud on
EMPIRE'S part because EMPIRE was purporting to convey property rights to
a third person under a VOID contract knowing that certain ommissions
under the contract would injure LUNDAHL.
LUNDAHL alleged contractual
damages against EMPIRE in the amount of $5,000. The judgment identifies
trebled damages of $15,000 being awarded to LUNDAHL as authorized under
the wrongful lien statute and the fiduciary fraud statute. LUNDAHL also
sued EMPIRE severally for emotional and mental distress. The record
shows that LUNDAHL served EMPIRE with requests for admissions wherein
she asked EMPIRE to admit that a damage award of $25,000 for emotional
and mental distress would be fair for EMPIRE xs participation in the
schemes alleged by LUNDAHL in her complaint. These admissions were made
part of the trial record before Tronier properly entered the default
judgment against EMPIRE. Also under Utah RICE, LUNDAHL was entitled to
any attorneys fees expended for prosecution of her claims. [It should be
noted that LUNDAHL paid attorney Mary Ann Hansen $2500 for special

)

assistance in the prosecution of her claims regarding her home.]
In
addition, in accordance with the mortgage contract LUNDAHL entered into
with EMPIRE,
LUNDAHL was entitled to prejudgment interest and other
costs for prevailing on any claims relating to her mortgage contract.
THE JUDGMENT SET FORTH IN EXHIBIT "51" ATTACHED TO THE OB WAS BASED ON
ADMITTED FACTS AND WAS SUPPORTED BY VALID CLAIMS PLED BY LUNDAHL IN THE
FAC.
AS to SOURCE ONE, a referral to exhibit "57" attached to the OB the judgment - shows the following admitted facts and identifies
LUNDAHL xs
valid legal claims against SOURCE ONE.
The admitted facts
are: (1) the backdated assignment contract on the 1st Note and trust
deed held by EMPIRE and recorded on April 9, 1996 was VOID because it
was backdated and because no consideration supported the assignment, (2)
the assignment of LUNDAHL's mortgage contract did not occur until April
30, 1996 when Source One supported the assignment contract with
consideration and the mortgage note was actually delivered to SOURCE
ONE;
(3) All of LUNDAHL's obligations as the trustor under the 1st Note
and Trust Deed were current to the date of April 30, 1996;
(4) SOURCE
ONE received LUNDAHL7 S May 1, 1996 mortgage payment and refused to cash
same in violation of the Mortgage* Servicing Act;
(5) SOURCE ONE
illegally froze Holli Lundahl's mortgage account commencing June 1,
1996;
(6) Holli Lundahl never defaulted upon her obligations under the
1st Note and Trust Deed;
(7) SOURCE ONE had no legal justification for
recording an instrument declaring Holli Lundahl in default;
(8) The
Notice of Default contained false msLterial statements;
(9) SOURCE ONE
caused innocent people to publish said false Notice of Default for the
purpose of defrauding LUNDAHL of money properties or other valuable
things constituting a violation of the Utah Fraudulent Communication
Fraud Act;
(10) SOURCE ONE was a beneficiary,
a self appointed
trustee and a fiduciary
to Holli Lundahl under the 1st Note and Trust
Deed;
(11) SOURCE ONE never served LUNDAHL statutory notice of the
Default or the trustee's sale thereby rendering both VOID;
(12)
recording of the Notice of default constituted the filing of a wrongful
lien in that it was materially false on it's face; (13) on December 13,
1996 without notice to LUNDAHL,
SOURCE ONE became the owner to
LUNDAHL's home at a trustee sale at which no one but SOURCE ONE
appeared;
(14) SOURCE ONE on December 13, 1996 converted $1,089,000 in
CONTRACTUALLY INSURED valuable real and personal properties belonging to
LUNDAHL on a
6500 square foot home with a pool, spa, decks, H acre
fully landscaped lot in an affluent neighborhood 1 block from the provo
temple;
(15) LUNDAHL was entitled to treble the actual damages
sustained from the conversion, under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act; Utah
RICE and RICO totaling $3,267,000.00; (17)
LUNDAHL was entitled to
statutory attorneys fees in the amount of $50,000 under RICE;
(18)
SOURCE ONE was a constituent entity of Fireman's Insurance Company of
Newark New Jersey at all times herein mentioned;
(19) CNA Financial
Corporation owns Fireman's Insurances Company of Newark New Jersey; (20)
CNA Financial Corporation owned Continental Insurance Company which
insured LUNDAHL's home against any losses LUNDAHL sustained; (21) CNA's
position as a mortgagee under the name of SOURCE ONE and CNA's position
as the insurer on LUNDAHL's mortgaged real property violated the

conflict of interest rules under the Utah Insurance Code and rendered
the assignment contract void under U.C.A. section 31A-4-107 (2) , and (22)
SOURCE ONE committed a wrongful foreclosure.
In addition, LUNDAHL
served upon SOURCE ONE requests for admissions wherein LUNDAHL requested
SOURCE ONE admit the amount of statutory damages LUNDAHL would be
entitled under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act; admit the amount of special
damages LUNDAHL would be entitled to for intentional infliction of
emotional and mental distress for a wrongful foreclosure, admit
attorneys and other contractual fees LUNDAHL would be entitled to as a
matter of law.
The record shows that SOURCE ONE received LUNDAHL's
requests for admissions and never filed an objection.
These requests
for admissions were submitted in support of LUNDAHL's default judgment
against SOURCE ONE. [See ex. >x57" attached to OB for default judgment.]
Since LUNDAHL stated valid claims against Source One and sought sum
certain damages,
then Tronier had a ministerial duty to enter
LUNDAHL's default judgment against SOURCE ONE under rule 55(b)(1) and
Harding Jr could not sua sponte set aside LUNDAHL's default against
SOURCE ONE because he lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so and
because LUNDAHL stated valid claims against SOURCE ONE.

